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I. INTRODUCTION
It seems that with each passing day, a new form of technology is created. Our society is
transforming into one reliant on the technology we are constantly introduced to. Computers, cell
phones, IPods, and IPads encourage us to rely on electronic pathways to live our daily lives. But
while we utilize technology each day, and trust these gadgets to store our most important tasks,
appointments, thoughts, and contacts, the law is struggling to keep up.
Cell phones have been a major problem for courts in recent years; more particularly, how
to apply the Fourth Amendment when a cell phone is searched by law enforcement officials
incident to an arrest. Some courts find that during arrests for routine traffic stops, it is reasonable
to search one’s cell phone without consent or notice to the cell phone owner. Other courts find
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment a necessary element to any search of a cell
phone, regardless of the circumstances surrounding the search.
Furthermore, companies such as Cellebrite market “mobile forensic” capabilities which
complicate this Fourth Amendment question. Cellebrite boasts “unparalleled access to phone
memory” regardless of phone lock codes or deleted items. 1 Cellebrite’s CEO Aviad Ofrat told a
trade magazine that “mobile device forensics is the future.”2 He further stated that “with the
wealth of data even a casual user has stored in his or her cell phone, smart-phone, or PDA, it is
quickly becoming THE one piece of evidence that is interrogated immediately.” 3 How far
should these companies, through law enforcement officers, be allowed to take their intrus ions
into one’s private life? This question has sparked much debate between law enforcement and
privacy advocates around the country.
1

CELLEBRIT E , http://www.cellebrite.com (last visited Nov. 11, 2011).
Alexis Madrigal, What Does Your Phone Know About You? More Than You Think , THE A T LANTIC (Apr. 25, 2011,
10:33 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/04/what -does-your-phone-know-about-you-morethan-you-think/237786/.
3
Id.
2
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Have our privacy rights disappeared as we store all of our private communications and
documents on our cell phones? Does a routine traffic stop allow a law enforcement officer to
search and extract data from a cell phone merely because they want to do so? If someone is
arrested, is that reason enough to have their cell phone’s history, call logs, applications, pictures,
messages, e-mails, and videos, among dozens of other personal items, be searched and extracted?
All of these privacy concerns have been examined by courts across the country, yet these courts
have come to very dissimilar conclusions.
This paper will analyze how courts have addressed warrantless cell phone searches, and
then apply this case law to mobile forensic technology to analyze how courts might address the
warrantless extraction of cell phone data. Additionally, it will consider where the line should be
drawn, if any, when it comes to searching and extracting the contents of a cell phone and further,
the emerging issues regarding “cloud computing” and privacy rights.

II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures. It
states that
the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.4
The Supreme Court recognizes that this “security” against unreasonable searches and seizures
upon the private lives of people is important and necessary and that “the framers of the Fourth
Amendment required adherence to judicial processes wherever possible.”5 The Court has also

4
5

U.S. CONST . amend. IV.
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 185 (1974) (citing Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948)).
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stated that “the presence of a search warrant serves a high function.”6 The primary role of the
Fourth Amendment is to place a magistrate judge between the citizen and the police and “absent
some grave emergency,” this system should not be disrupted. 7 Therefore, whenever practicable,
and if no exception to the warrant requirement applies, “the police must…obtain advance judicial
approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure” and “the scope of [a] search
must be ‘strictly tied to and justified by’ the circumstances which rendered its initiation
permissible.”8
It is well established law that “the capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth
Amendment depends…upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment
has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.”9 The Supreme Court has adopted
the Katz test from Justice Harlan’s famous concurrence which explained that there are two parts
to any inquiry into whether someone has a legitimate expectation of privacy: first, privacy must
be looked at subjectively, meaning someone must have exhibited an actual expectation of
privacy, and second, one’s expectation of privacy must be “one that society is prepared to
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”10
A. EXCEPTIONS TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S WARRANT REQUIREMENT
Exceptions to the warrant requirement have been named “few in number and carefully
delineated,”11 giving law enforcement the heavy burden of demonstrating “an urgent need that

6

Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004) (citing McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948)).
United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1168 (6th Cir. 1984) (citing McDonald, 335 U.S. at 455).
8
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1968) (A search undertaken during a “stop and frisk” was found reasonable
because it was a protective search for weapons, thus, an acceptable warrantless search under the Fourth
Amendment).
9
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).
10
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
11
United States v. U.S. District Court (Plamondon), 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972).
7
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might justify [a] warrantless search.”12 However, courts have recognized that the “overriding
principle of the Fourth Amendment is one of reasonableness,” and thus, exceptions to the
warrant requirement have been “carved out in a logical and flexible manner.”13
First and foremost, if a suspect or arrestee voluntarily consents to a search, without any
form of police coercion, a warrant is not required.14 Additionally, the warrant requirement is
excused when exigent circumstances are present. Exigent circumstances “excuse an officer from
having to obtain a magistrate’s determination that probable cause exists; it does not permit a
search in the absence of probable cause.”15 These circumstances require immediate action to be
undertaken by law enforcement in order to “prevent flight, safeguard the police or public, or to
protect against the loss of evidence.”16 In addition to probable cause to search, an officer “must
have probable cause to believe that the persons or items to be searched or seized might be gone,
or that some other danger would arise, before a warrant could be obtained.”17 The focus
becomes whether “‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so
compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” 18
Another exception is the “search incident to arrest.” The Supreme Court has held that
immediately upon arresting an individual, an officer may lawfully search that person without
obtaining a warrant.19 Officers may also search the area within the arrestee's immediate
control.20 These warrantless searches have traditionally been justified by the fact that it is

12

Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749 (1984).
United States v. Martin, 806 F.2d 204, 206 (8th Cir. 1986).
14
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973) (holding that a search pursuant to consent, properly
conducted, is a constitutionally permissible and wholly legitimate aspect of effective police activity).
15
ST EPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, A MERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE INVEST IGATIVE : CASES AND
COMMENT ARY 361 (9th ed. 2010).
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
19
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
20
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
13
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reasonable for law enforcement to immediately search for weapons, instruments of escape, and
evidence of a crime upon an arrest. 21 These have been called “protective searches” since they
address the possibility that a weapon may be easily accessible to an arrestee that may put officers
at risk, or evidence on or around an arrestee that could be concealed or destroyed. The Court has
reasoned that “a gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous
to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested” and that,
therefore, there is “ample justification…for a search of the arrestee’s person and the area within
his immediate control.”22
Searches that are incident to arrests and based on probable cause have also included preincarceration “inventory searches” which have also been deemed admissible and do not require a
warrant under the Fourth Amendment. This is because the lawful arrest itself establishes
authority to search, and therefore “a full search of the person is not only an exception to the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that
Amendment.”23 An inventory search must be regulated by “standardized criteria” or
“established routine” so as not to “be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover
incriminating evidence.”24 The search may include containers or articles in an arrestee’s
possession at the time of arrest.25 A container is “any object capable of holding another
object.”26 Containers include “glove compartments, consoles, or other receptacles located
anywhere within [a] passenger compartment, as well as luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and the

21

United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802-03 (1974).
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.
23
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
24
Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990).
25
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983).
26
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
22
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like” and may be searched whether they are open or closed.27 Such container searches have been
permitted not because a suspect has no privacy interests in his personal effects, but because “[a]
lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest” a suspect may have in
such effects.28
Another common exception is the “plain view doctrine.” In some circumstances, law
enforcement officers may seize evidence in plain view without having a warrant. 29 Under
Coolidge, the plain view doctrine applies when three requirements are met: “(1) the intrusion by
the police must have a prior justification under the Fourth Amendment; (2) the discovery of the
evidence must be ‘inadvertent’; and (3) it must be ‘immediately apparent’ to the police that the
items are evidence or otherwise subject to seizure.”30 The Supreme Court, however, has clarified
that “while inadvertence is a characteristic of most legitimate ‘plain view’ seizures, it is not a
necessary condition.”31 Similarly, the “inevitable discovery doctrine” is an exception
maintaining that “evidence obtained during the course of an unreasonable search and seizure
should not be excluded ‘if the government can prove that the evidence would have been obtained
inevitably’ without the constitutional violation.”32
The automobile exception to the warrant requirement addresses the warrantless search of
an automobile that has been stopped by law enforcement officers who had probable cause to
believe that the vehicle contained incriminating evidence. 33 Often it may not be practicable to
secure a warrant for the automobile if “the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or

27

Id. See infra Part III.A (discussing case law finding cell phones to be containers), and Part IV.C.3 (suggesting the
possibility that “electronic containers” could be an exception to the general container rule).
28
Id. at 461.
29
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971).
30
Martin, 806 F.2d at 206–07.
31
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 130 (1990).
32
United States v. Heath, 455 F.3d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 447 (1984)).
33
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
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jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.”34 The general rule is that “if a car is readily
mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth
Amendment…permits police to search the vehicle without more.”35 The Supreme Court has
extended this rule by stating that the warrantless search of an automobile could include a
“probing search” of a container or package found inside the car when the search is supported by
probable cause.36 Thus, “if probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it
justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the
search.”37
B. HOW ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY HAVE CHANGED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
As new technology arises, it changes and enhances the world in which we live, so the law
adapts accordingly. The Supreme Court openly acknowledged that “it would be foolish to
contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been
entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.”38 Today, the advancements in cell phone
technology provide law enforcement with a “virtual Rolodex of alleged criminal contacts –
something that days of coercion, interrogation or even torture may not reveal.”39 Very quickly,
these advanced cell phones are becoming less of a secure and private communication tool, rather,
they are more of a “hangman’s noose.”40 But should advancements in technology force us to
give up our core civil liberties and constitutional rights? Not necessarily. Although the Fourth
Amendment has been interpreted to protect a citizen’s right of privacy, “the extent to which the
Fourth Amendment provides protection for the contents of electronic communications (such as
34

Id. at 569 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1923)).
Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996).
36
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 800 (1982).
37
Id. at 825.
38
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001)
39
David Mock, Wireless Advances the Criminal Enterprise, THE FEAT URE A RCHIVES W EB (June 28, 2002),
http://thefeaturearchives.com/topic/Technology/Wireless_Advances_the_Criminal_Enterprise.html.
40
Id.
35
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images stored on a cell phone)…is an open question.”41 The way courts interpret the Fourth
Amendment will ultimately give us guidance into how protected we are with respect to the
information stored in cell phones.

1. APPLICATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO CELL PHONES
Today, cell phones are used for countless reasons by millions of people.42 Advances in
cell phone technology have equipped users with portable personal computers, allowing people to
store everything they need to live their daily lives on a handheld device. The potential
information stored on cell phones includes items such as “subscriber and equipment identifiers;
phonebook information; appointment calendars; text messages; call logs for dialed, incoming,
and missed calls; email; photographs; audio and video recordings; multimedia messages; instant
messaging; Web browsing history; electronic documents; and user location information.”43
No longer do cell phones merely place calls without a landline connection; cell phones
have become very “smart.” A “smartphone” is “a cellular telephone with an integrated computer
and other features not originally associated with telephones, such as an operating system, Web
browsing and the ability to run software applications” along with “texting, gaming, personal
information management and cameras.”44 Smartphones provide advanced computing and have
the capability to run mobile applications with more connectivity, processing, and storage options

41

Newhard v. Borders, 649 F. Supp. 2d 440, 448 (W.D. Va. 2009).
“As of June 2010, there were approximately 292.8 million U.S. cell phone users.” Ashley B. Snyder, Comment,
The Fourth Amendment and Warrantless Cell Phone Searches: When is Your Cell Phone Protected?, 46 W AKE
FOREST L. REV. 155, 162 (2011).
43
Id. at 162-63.
44
Smartphone, SEARCH M OBILE COMPUTING, http://searchmobilecomputing.techtarget.com/definition/smartphone
(last updated Aug. 2000).
42
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than regular cell phones.45 A smartphone is “a social network and entertainment center all rolled
into a solitary, convenient device.”46
With the vast amount of information accessible from a cell phone, privacy issues would
necessarily transpire. It is obvious why law enforcement officers would want to search a cell
phone’s content in the hopes they might find something incriminating to use later against the
arrestee-cell phone owner. Courts in turn must maintain the privacy every citizen expects in
their handheld technology to the extent it is reasonable in each arrest situation. “Smartphones
make up a growing share of the United States mobile phones market, and are likely to be
pervasive in the near future…The question of when and how they may be searched is therefore
an important one.”47
2. DO PEOPLE HAVE A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN THEIR CELL
PHONES?
Courts have come to varied conclusions as to whether the Katz test has been satisfied so
as to provide a reasonable expectation of privacy to a cell phone user in their device.

48

The

background case law on telephone landlines marks the beginning of this discussion. In the 1979
Supreme Court case Smith v. Maryland, police officers, without a warrant, installed a pen
register in a telephone system to intercept calls coming into a robbery victim’s home in order to
establish who and where the calls were coming from.49 Once the defendant was identified as the
caller, the Court held that the defendant did not have an expectation of privacy in the numbers
that he dialed from his phone since those numbers were automatically turned over to a third

45

David W. Bennett, The Challenges Facing Computer Forensics Investigators in Obtaining Information from
Mobile Devices for Use in Criminal Investigations, FORENSIC FOCUS: A RT ICLES/PAPERS (Aug. 20, 2011),
http://articles.forensicfocus.com/2011/08/22/the-challenges-facing-computer-forensics-investigators-in-obtaininginformation-from-mobile-devices-for-use-in-criminal-investigations/.
46
Id.
47
People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 514 (Cal. 2011) (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
48
See cases cited supra note 10 for a discussion of the Katz test.
49
Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.
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party, the phone company.50 The Court also stated that even if the defendant did have some
subjective expectation of privacy in the numbers he dialed, this was not an expectation that
society was prepared to recognize as reasonable.51 Therefore, the Court ultimately held that the
installation of the pen register to recover telephone numbers dialed by the defendant was not a
“search” under the Fourth Amendment, and no warrant was required.
While Smith was decided before cell phones were in use, the same issue the Supreme
Court addressed back in 1979 is called into question now: if a cell phone user has provided
information to third parties like Verizon and AT&T, do they have an expectation of privacy in
their call logs? Courts today generally conclude that the content and information a person stores
on his or her cell phone, like one’s call log, is entitled to some form of privacy. 52 In order to
obtain this information, most courts agree that a warrant is required, unless an exception to the
warrant requirement applies. Many courts have found that a person has a reasonable expectation
of privacy in their cell phone when they claim to have a possessory interest, a right to control
access, or show some sort of subjective expectation of privacy, for example, by taking
precautionary measures to maintain the expected privacy like locking the phone or keeping it on
his or her person.53

50

Id. at 742-44.
Id. at 743.
52
See, e.g., State v. Boyd, 992 A.2d 1071, 1082 (Conn. 2010) (individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
all of the contents of his cell phone, including his subscriber number); United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 577
(5th Cir. 2008) (individual has reasonable expectation of privacy in information contained in cell phone because
they contain a wealth of private information); United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1299 (M .D. Fla.
2008) (“An owner of a cell phone generally has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the electronic data stored on
the phone.”); United States v. Morales -Ortiz, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1139 (D.N.M. 2004) (There is “an expectation
of privacy in an electronic repository for personal data, including cell telephones.”); United States v. James, No.
1:06CR134, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34864, at *10 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 29, 2008) (“It is reasonable for a person to expect the
information contained in a cell phone—especially information such as that contained in the address book, which is
not available even to the service provider—will be free from intrusion from both the government and the general
public.”). But see United States v. Mercado-Nava, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1276 (D. Kan. 2007) (Defendant did not
assert ownership to the phones, nor did he present any evidence that they were his or insure his privacy in them, so
the court found that he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of the phones).
53
See State v. Sealy, 546 A.2d 271, 273 (Conn. 1988); United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259 (5th Cir. 1997).
51
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III. THE SPLIT OF AUTHORITY REGARDING WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF CELL PHONES
There is a split of authority, in both federal and state courts, regarding whether a warrant
is required to search a cell phone or retrieve information on a cell phone pursuant to an arrest.
The case law on this subject analyzes whether the search of the phone is legitimate and, for the
purposes of this paper, provides a framework for analyzing the constitutionality of using
extraction technology.
A. CASES THAT FIND SEARCHES OF A CELL PHONE WITHOUT A WARRANT REASONABLE
Courts that find warrantless cell phone searches reasonable generally follow the search
incident to arrest exception or the exigency exception to the Fourth Amendment. Searches have
been deemed necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence when incoming calls or text
messages override previous ones, or have been justified as inventory searches. Cell phones have
also been compared to pagers, which most courts have found to be searchable without a warrant.
Courts also maintain that the type of information stored on one’s cell phone is similar to that
which is found in a wallet or address book, both of which have been found to be searchable
incident to arrest.54
1. FEDERAL LAW PERMITTING WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
In 2009, the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Murphy upheld a warrantless search of an
arrestee’s cell phone under the search incident to arrest exception. 55 In this case, after the
officers had arrested the defendant for obstruction of justice for giving them false names, the
officers searched the defendant’s phone to uncover possible incriminating evidence about the
54

United States v. Cote, No. 03CR271, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11725, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2005) (“Searches of
items such as wallets and address books, which [the court] consider[ed] analogous to [Defendant’s] cellular phone
since they would contain similar information, have long been held valid when made incident to an arrest.”), aff'd,
504 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2007).
55
United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 411 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2016 (2009).
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defendant regarding drug activity and the existence of counterfeit money. 56 The search of the
phone occurred multiple times; once in the defendant’s presence and again at the police
department.57 The searches ultimately uncovered text messages that were determined to be sent
from the defendant’s drug dealer.58 The court found that the searches of the defendant’s phone
were acceptable without a warrant because the first search was a search incident to defendant’s
lawful arrest, and the second search was a valid inventory search which was also necessary to
preserve evidence stored on the phone.59 The court determined that “officers may retrieve text
messages and other information from cell phones and pagers seized incident to an arrest” for the
purpose of preservation since call logs and text messages may be overwritten as new calls and
text messages are received.60
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Finley, found that the law enforcement
officer’s warrantless cell phone search of the defendant’s call log and text messages was proper
as incident to a lawful arrest.61 The defendant in Finley was arrested on drug charges and,
incident to his arrest, he was searched and his phone was seized. 62 Although the officers
transported the defendant to the accomplice’s home and later searched the cell phone outside the
home, after the defendant had already been taken into custody, the search was still “substantially
contemporaneous with his arrest.”63 The court justified the search as permissible by
characterizing the phone as a container, and therefore, searchable upon the defendant’s lawful

56

Id. at 409.
Id. at 412.
58
Id. at 409.
59
Id. at 412.
60
Id.
61
United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007); accord United States v. Curtis, 635 F.3d 704, 712 (5th
Cir. 2011).
62
Finley, 477 F.3d at 253.
63
Id. at 260.
57
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arrest.64 The court decided that “police officers are not constrained to search only for weapons
or instruments of escape on the arrestee's person; they may also, without any additional
justification, look for evidence of the arrestee's crime on his person in order to preserve it for use
at trial.”65 In United States v. Curtis, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a denial of the defendant’s
motion to suppress text messages taken on his phone pursuant to the Finley rule of authorizing
police officers to search the electronic contents of an arrestee’s cell phone recovered from the
area within said arrestee’s immediate control. 66
The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Ortiz, also followed the search incident to arrest
exception when addressing the issue of a warrantless search.67 While this case concerned a
pager, a pager is very similar to a cell phone in that it stores personal information and data, and
there is an identical necessity to preserve evidence in pagers as there is in cell phones as
discussed in Murphy.68 In Ortiz, the court held that law enforcement officers may search or
retrieve information from a pager in order to prevent its destruction as evidence. 69 The court
maintained that “an officer’s need to preserve evidence is an important law enforcement
component of the rationale for permitting a search of a suspect incident to a valid arrest.”70
Further, due to the “finite nature of a pager’s electronic memory, incoming pages may destroy
currently stored telephone numbers in a pager’s memory.”71

64

Id.
Id.
66
United States v. Curtis, 635 F.3d 704, 711-14 (5th Cir. 2011).
67
United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Pineda-Areola, 372 F. App’x
661, 662 (7th Cir. 2010); accord Silvan W. v. Briggs, 309 F. App’x 216, 225 (10th Cir. 2009).
68
Murphy, 552 F.3d at 412. See also United States v. Young, 278 F. App’x 242, 245-46 (4th Cir. 2008) (per
curiam) (noting that the Fourth Circuit had previously found pagers to be searchable incident to arrest, and
extending this reasoning to justify the search incident to arrest of a cell phone's text messages).
69
Ortiz, 84 F.3d at 984.
70
Id.
71
Id.
65
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The District Court of Minnesota followed Finley and Ortiz in deciding that if a cell phone
is lawfully seized, officers may also search any data electronically stored in the device.”72 In this
case, after arresting one of two defendants for drug distribution and conspiracy, the officers
searched the “electronic memory” of his two cell phones for information linking both the two
defendants and their criminal acts.”73 Further, the District Court of Arizona decided a case
where a defendant was arrested for drug-trafficking and law enforcement agents searched the
phone only minutes after the arrest and later seized the phone for the purpose of uncovering his
call log.74 Based upon the fact that the agents were in a desperate need to find other suspects
who were at large, as well as the good reason they had to believe that the other suspects were in
contact with the defendant through his cell phone, the court found this search permissible as a
search incident to an arrest.75 Additionally, the court noted that “there is authority for the
proposition that cell phones…in drug-trafficking investigations may come within the plain view
exception to the warrant requirement as items akin to contraband, in that they are often tools of
the drug-trafficking trade.”76
The District Court of Kansas rejected the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized
from his cell phone pursuant to a warrantless search. 77 The officers searched the cell phone after
the defendant was arrested for various drug charges, and the court found that the search was
properly within the scope of an inventory search pursuant to a search incident to arrest. 78 A
question remained, however, whether the officer in this case was acting unreasonably when

72

United States v. Deans, 549 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1094 (D. Minn. 2008).
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noting the numbers of incoming calls that the phone was receiving and storing in its memory. 79
The court concluded that “because a cell phone has a limited memory to store numbers” the
officer acted reasonably when he recorded the numbers “in the event that subsequent incoming
calls effected the deletion or overwriting of the earlier stored numbers.”80 Ultimately, as a matter
of exigency, the court held that the officer had “the authority to immediately search or retrieve
the cell phone’s memory of stored numbers of incoming calls in order to prevent the destruction
of this evidence.”81
2. STATE LAW PERMITTING WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
This year, in People v. Diaz, the Supreme Court of California determined that the search
of the defendant’s cell phone text message folder, which occurred at the police station, was valid
without a warrant.82 The defendant was arrested for being a coconspirator in the sale of drugs,
and his cell phone was located on his person.83 The issue became whether it was unreasonable
that the search of the cell phone was delayed until after the defendant was taken into custody. 84
If the court determined that the cell phone was “immediately associated with [his] person,” then
the delayed warrantless search was valid incident to his lawful arrest, but if it was not, then the
search was invalid as being too “remote in time and place from the arrest” unless an exigency
applied.85 The court ultimately held the search to be valid because the cell phone “was an item
[of personal property] on [defendant’s] person at the time of his arrest and during the
administrative processing at the police station.”86 The court analogized the cell phone to an
article of clothing found on a person, just as the phone was found on the defendant and in his
79
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immediate control.87 Although the court found no exigent circumstances apparent to otherwise
justify the warrantless search, the immediate association of the cell phone with the defendant
after the arrest was enough to justify the police inspection at the station without a warrant.88
A Florida appellate court also upheld the warrantless search of a cell phone when a police
officer searched the defendant’s cell phone pursuant to his arrest for sexual battery of a child.89
When the officer first took possession of the phone from the defendant’s pocket, the defendant
became very nervous, causing the officer to flip open the phone to ensure that it was not a
disguised weapon.90 Upon opening the phone, the officer noticed that the wallpaper behind the
phone’s main menu was a picture of a prepubescent female in a sexually compromised
position.91 Based upon the nature of the defendant’s arrest, the officer decided to search the
media files on the cell phone, further uncovering images of child pornography.92 The court
followed Finley and concluded that the phone was a container and searchable under the search
incident to arrest exception.93 It stated that “digital files and programs on cell phones have
merely served as replacements for personal effects like address books, calendar books, photo
albums, and file folders previously carried in a tangible form.”94 Further, when viewed in this
light, the phone was merely a case, a closed container, containing these personal effects. 95
A Georgia appellate court upheld a warrantless cell phone search of the defendant’s
phone following her arrest for unlawfully attempting to purchase a controlled substance.96 The
officer had been using the alleged drug dealer’s cell phone to communicate with the defendant
87
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and ultimately plan a meeting for her to make a buy.97 At the designated meeting spot, the
officer observed the defendant in her car “entering data into her phone” and the officer “almost
contemporaneously received another text message” announcing her arrival at the meeting
place.98 The officer approached the defendant’s car, identified himself, and arrested her. 99 With
the defendant’s consent, and as a search incident to her arrest, the officer searched the
defendant’s vehicle and uncovered her cell phone inside her purse. 100 The officer searched the
phone for the text messages regarding the drug sale and, to preserve the messages, the officer
downloaded and printed them.101 The court determined that “when an officer is authorized to
search in a vehicle for a specific object and…comes across a container that reasonably might
contain the object of his search,” namely, the cell phone, “the officer is authorized to open the
container and search within it for the object.”102 Accordingly, the court held that the cell phone
was enough like a container to be treated like one “in the context of a search for electronic data,”
and the officer, believing that he would find what he was seeking on the phone, was therefore
within reason when he searched its contents. 103
B. CASES THAT FIND SEARCHES OF A CELL PHONE WITHOUT A WARRANT UNREASONABLE
Other federal and state courts have chosen to prohibit warrantless cell phone searches
entirely. These courts generally rely on the principle that no exigency or need for officer safety
exists, or that a delay between the arrest and the search was unreasonable. Further, these courts
recognize that the immense amount of personal data stored on cell phones generates a greater
expectation of privacy, and thus, justifies heightened protection under the Fourth Amendment.
97

Id.
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 889.
103
Id. at 890.
98

18

1. FEDERAL LAW PROHIBITING WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
The District Court of Nebraska concluded that the warrantless search of defendant’s cell
phone was unreasonable.104 The defendant was arrested in 2009 for distributing and conspiring
to distribute crack cocaine in 2008.105 During a search pursuant to his arrest, a cell phone was
obtained from the defendant and the officer scanned and saved the contact list on the phone. 106
The court concluded that this search was unjustified because the officer could not reasonably
believe that searching the phone would uncover evidence of a crime that allegedly occurred a
year earlier.107 Further, “the phone did not present a risk of harm to officers or appear to be
contraband or destructible evidence.”108 The court determined that the search was an invalid
search incident to arrest.109
The District Court for the Northern District of California granted a motion to suppress the
warrantless search of the defendants’ cell phones.110 The defendants in this case were arrested
for conducting a drug operation inside a residence.111 At the time of their arrests, no officer
searched or seized any of the defendants’ cell phones. 112 Once at the station, the cell phones’
address books and memory were searched by the officers.113 The court held that the officers did
not successfully point to any exception to the warrant requirement to justify the searches and that
the searches were “purely investigatory.”114 Since the search of the phones occurred more than
an hour and a half after the arrest, it went “far beyond the original rationales for searches incident
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to arrest, which were to remove weapons to ensure the safety of officers and bystanders, and the
need to prevent concealment or destruction of evidence.”115 The court also noted that since cell
phones “have the capacity for storing immense amounts of private information,” they are similar
to computers, in which arrestees have significant privacy interests, rather than address books or
pagers found on one’s person, in which one’s privacy interest decreases. 116
The District Court of Hawaii granted a motion to suppress all of the evidence obtained
from the defendant’s cell phone during a search that was not determined to be contemporaneous
with the defendant’s arrest.117 In this case, the defendant was arrested for being involved with
drug smuggling and two cell phones were taken from him upon arrest. 118 At the station, while
the defendant was being processed, an officer searched the phones under the belief that they
might contain evidence of a crime.119 One of the phones was unlocked and the officer was able
to observe the defendant’s recent calls, text messages, and address book. 120 The court
determined, however, that the time period between the arrest and the search “spanned
somewhere between two hours and fifteen minutes to three hours and forty-five minutes,” and
the arrest and search also took place miles apart from each other. 121 The government did not
provide any legitimate excuse for the delay, and therefore, judging from the time period and
physical distance between the arrest and search, the court held that the search was not “at about
the same time of the arrest” or “roughly contemporaneous” with the arrest. 122
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2. STATE LAW PROHIBITING WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
The Ohio Supreme Court, in State v. Smith, was the first high court in the country to
consider the topic of a warrantless cell phone search incident to arrest. 123 In this case, the
defendant was arrested for selling drugs and officers searched his cell phone for call records and
phone numbers that could further prove the defendant’s job as a drug dealer.124 While the state
wanted the court to characterize the cell phone as a closed container like in Finley, the court
refused.125 Instead, the court reasoned, as the U.S. Supreme Court has, that “objects falling
under the banner of ‘closed container’ have traditionally been physical objects capable of
holding other physical objects,” which a cell phone is not. 126 The court acknowledged that,
while in the past, electronic devices such as pagers were found to be closed containers subject to
search, these cases never considered the U.S. Supreme Court’s definition of container “which
implies that the container must actually have a physical object within it.”127 Due to the modern
cell phone’s ability to store “a wealth of digitized information wholly unlike any physical object
found within a closed container” it could not be considered “a closed container for the purpose of
a Fourth Amendment analysis.”128 Additionally, the court also found that there was no evidence
that the search of the phone’s content was necessary to ensure the officer’s safety or to prevent
imminent destruction of the information. 129 Thus, the court held that the cell phone search was
unreasonable and intrusive and a warrant should have been secured.

IV. MOBILE FORENSIC TECHNOLOGY USED IN THE EXTRACTION OF CELL PHONE INFORMATION
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The constitutionality of warrantless cell phone searches has been considered for more
than a decade. Rick Mislan, an assistant professor of computer and information technology at
Purdue University, stated that “cell phones are ubiquitous in today’s world and nearly all crimes
have a digital component to them.”130 As the number of cell phone users, as well as the types of
cell phones available with unlimited abilities, increases, it is reasonable to see why law
enforcement desires the ability to flip through a person’s phone to uncover incriminating
information. Now, officers can not only flip through a phone, but they can also extract the
content of the phone.131 Before extraction technology became available, law enforcement
agencies were no doubt at a disadvantage to criminals. 132 Tracking and extraction devices, with
the help of mobile device forensics, are becoming increasingly available to assist law
enforcement in obtaining information on cell phones. However the extraction process can prove
to be very difficult due to the “volatile nature of electronic evidence.”133
Cell phone users are generally innocent as “most cell phone owners think simply
removing a phone’s SIM card removes personal information, but the phone’s internal memory,
even communication exchanged between the phone and its server, remain.”134 It is mobile
forensic technology that makes all of the so called deleted information retrievable again.
Everyday users “continue to pump ever more data into cell phones . . . those indispensable
companions that have so much to say about us.”135 Yet mobile forensics continue to expand in
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nature, and are ultimately able to “get a fingerprint of who [a] person really is” via the
information taken off of their cell phone. 136
A. WHAT IS MOBILE FORENSIC TECHNOLOGY?
Mobile device forensics entails “recovering digital evidence from a mobile device under
forensically sound conditions.”137 “Forensically sound” means using “a particular technology or
methodology.”138 The need for mobile device forensics was created by “the use of mobile
phones in online transactions such as stock trading, flight reservations and check-in; mobile
banking; and communications regarding illegal activities that are being utilized by criminals.”139
Mobile forensic software tools access a wide range of devices to handle “the most
common investigative situations with modest skill level requirements” while keeping the device
intact.140 Some situations are more difficult, such as recovering deleted information, and require
specialized tools and expertise, and perhaps even the disassembling of the cell phone itself. 141
The most important characteristic of forensic tools is the “ability to maintain the integrity of the
original data source being acquired and also that of the extracted data.”142
The forensic investigator completing the data extraction has one priority, that is, to use
the most acceptable methods of obtaining evidence so that the evidence will be admitted
accordingly and in an acceptable manner at trial. 143 The evidence will usually be admitted if the
trial judge finds that the search was lawful and that “the chain of custody rules including
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evidence collection, evidence preservation, analysis, and reporting” were adhered to.144 The
International Organization on Computer Evidence has published general principles that are to be
followed when recovering digital evidence for chain of custody:
1. All of the general forensic and procedural principles should be adhered to when
dealing with digital evidence.
2. Upon seizing digital evidence, any actions taken should not modify the original
evidence.
3. When it is necessary for personnel to access the original digital evidence, the
personnel should be appropriately trained for the purpose.
4. All activities associated to the seizure, access, storage or transfer of digital
evidence must be fully and properly documented, preserved and available for
review.
5. An individual is responsible for all actions taken with respect to digital
evidence when digital evidence is in that individual’s possession.
6. Any agency that is responsible for seizing, accessing, storing or transferring
digital evidence is responsible for compliance with all six principles. 145
Because of the advancements in cell phones and smartphones, forensic investigation techniques
used to recover information have become highly complex and numerous companies in the
mobile forensic field boast the capability of obtaining the information law enforcement desires.
B. CELLEBRITE
Cellebrite has been used for over a decade, and “provides the widest coverage in the
[mobile forensics] market.”146 Its technology continues to be the most popular of all the mobile
forensic technologies. The Cellebrite Universal Forensics Extraction Device (UFED) Forensic
System is a device used in the field and the research lab.147 It supports “most cellular device
interfaces…and can provide data extraction of content such as audio, video, phone call history
and deleted text messages stored in mobile phones.”148 Cellebrite’s UFED System works with
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Apple’s iPhone, as well as over 3,000 phones by “suck[ing] data out…without the need for an
intermediary computer.”149 Cellebrite maintains that it is the “tool of choice for thousands of
forensic specialists in police, special forces, tax fraud, customs, border control, and anti-terrorist
investigations in more than 60 countries.”150 Cellebrite calls its technology easy to use because
UFED gathers its retrieved data into reports for research and evidence which can later be
admitted in court.151
Cellebrite’s tools are made to “dump the entirety of your phone…all of your text
messages, emails, videos, and photos – even the ones you deleted – Google Map queries…web
searches, passwords, call logs…your phone’s entire file system.”152 This information is “all
timestamped, all geotagged, all providing a digital recreation of the way your physical existence
projects itself into the cellular ether.”153 Cellebrite’s website maintains that “for law
enforcement, leveraging this valuable resource of information with Cellebrite’s UFED System
ensures that you get every bit of information necessary to more effectively reach your crime
solving goals.”154
Besides Cellebrite, which claims to have sold 3,500 devices in the eleven months since its
UFED System reached the market, other devices are commonly sold and used by law
enforcement.155 Paraben Corporation, Micro Systemation, Susteen, Compelson Labs, Radio
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Tactics, Final Data, Oxygen Software, and Katana Forensics, the makers of Lantern,156 are other
companies which sell devices for cell phone extraction.
C. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WARRANTLESS EXTRACTION OF CELL PHONE DATA
There are many legitimate pros and cons for needing a warrant to search ones cell phone,
and further, to extract the data from the phone itself. As a threshold issue, it must be determined
whether extracted data from one’s phone, by the use of mobile forensic technology such as
Cellebrite, is a search or seizure that would be subject to the Fourth Amendment requirements.
A search occurs when “an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable
is infringed.”157 The seizure of property occurs when “there is some meaningful interference
with an individual’s possessory interest in that property.”158 This determination should be
considered in light of where the extraction takes place. Additionally, whether a cell phone can
be characterized as a container will further determine the constitutionality of using mobile
forensic technology to extract data from cell phones.
1. IF THE EXTRACTION TECHNOLOGY IS BEING USED IN A LAB SETTING
If a law enforcement officer has arrested a suspect and desires to search their phone, it
may be necessary to take the phone to a lab so that the extraction could be conducted in
forensically sound conditions. In this case, it would seem obvious that the phone has been seized
in order to take it to an off-site location to extract the data. The Fourth Amendment is thus
implicated, and unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies, a warrant would be
necessary to search and extract the phone.
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If the phone is taken to a lab, there is significant time between when the phone is taken
and when it is connected to a program that will extract its information. Therefore, in the context
of a warrantless search and seizure, law enforcement cannot rely on the fact that emergency
discounts the need for a warrant, or that any exigency exception could apply. Regardless of how
long it takes for an officer to reach a lab from the scene of an arrest, it is reasonable to assume
that the officer could obtain a warrant in the proper way, either in person or electronically.
Additionally, an officer cannot claim that there is a risk that evidence will be destroyed,
concealed, or overridden. Mobile forensic technology prides itself on the ability to obtain
information that has been deleted or hidden on a phone. As in Murphy, preservation of evidence
is no longer necessary as companies like Cellebrite can “dump the entirety” of a person’s phone,
deleted information and all.159
The Supreme Court has held that when an officer makes an arrest, it is reasonable to
search the person arrested in order to “remove any weapons that the [arrestee] might seek to use
in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.”160 The Court said that “otherwise, the officer's
safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated.”161 First and foremost, a cell
phone is not a gun. It is not dangerous, and it can pose minimal, if any, immediate threat to an
arresting officer. By arresting a suspect and removing a cell phone, especially if the phone is
removed for the purposes of taking it to an off-site lab for extraction, an officer cannot be
considered to be in any danger, nor can the cell phone be used in any way to effect an escape by,
perhaps, a suspect calling a co-conspirator for assistance.
There are no exceptions to the warrant requirement that would deter an officer from
obtaining a warrant to extract information from a cell phone when the phone is being taken to a
159
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lab. Due to the time lapse between the arrest itself and the later extraction, a law enforcement
officer has no excuse not to call a magistrate and obtain a warrant in order to avoid any potential
Fourth Amendment violation.
2. IF THE EXTRACTION TECHNOLOGY IS BEING USED AT THE SITE OF ARREST
Companies such as Cellebrite maintain that their devices may be used in the field as well
as a research lab.162 Therefore, if law enforcement officers have mobile forensic technology
equipment with them at the scene of an arrest, and have the required training necessary to
effectuate a valid extraction, a warrant may not be required in such an instance to search the
phone and further, seize the content of it.
Most courts which hold that searches of a cell phone without a warrant are reasonable
follow the search incident to an arrest exception to the warrant requirement. The Finley court
found the search substantially contemporaneous with the defendant’s arrest. 163 Similarly, the
Diaz court found that the “immediate association” of the cell phone with the defendant after his
arrest entitled the police to inspect the phone’s contents without a warrant. 164 If there is
sufficient evidence that trained officers have conducted an on-site extraction of a valid arrestee’s
phone as a search incident to arrest, then no warrant would be necessary. Determining if the onsite extraction is sufficient without a warrant is a fact-based inquiry that must consider all of the
possible warrant exceptions to the Fourth Amendment. At the scene of an arrest, it is likely that
a warrant may not be necessary due to exigent circumstances such as safeguarding the police or
the public from an ongoing crime, or protecting against the loss of evidence on the cell phone.
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Another consideration for an on-site extraction is whether the cell phone is a container.
Some courts have held that a cell phone does qualify as a closed container, 165 while other courts
have held that a cell phone cannot be considered a container because it is not “capable of holding
other physical objects.”166 Therefore, only if a cell phone is found to be a container pursuant to a
valid inventory search, will a warrant not be required to search and extract information from the
phone. If, on the other hand, a cell phone is not a container, then a warrant must be required to
search and extract anything from it. The future of Fourth Amendment protections for cell phones
depends on their being designated as “electronic containers,” and thus, not searchable without a
warrant.
3. IS THERE SUCH THING AS AN ELECTRONIC CONTAINER?
The question of whether a cell phone can be characterized as a container, and thus
searchable, has yet to be unanimously determined. The Supreme Court defined “containe r” in
1981, prior to the widespread use of cell phones, and did not specifically address “the authority
to search a device’s electronic memory.”167 Perhaps a new type of container—an “electronic
container”—should be defined by all courts in the future to help resolve this issue.
A cell phone is able to store an enormous amount of digital information “inside” itself.
With constant advances in cell phone technology, it may be time for the law to limit its definition
of a container to exclude the digital content on cell phones, classifying “electronic containers” as
an exception to the ordinary container exception. If courts adopt this definition of electronic
containers, then law enforcement would be required to obtain a warrant before searching and
extracting the data contained on the phones. Although cell phones are, by definition, containers,
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albeit of digital content, the unique nature of this content justifies a new rule which excludes
searching electronic containers as a valid inventory search incident to arrest. Due to the
incredible amount of personal information that can be stored on a phone, such as medical and
financial records, users have “a reasonable and justifiable expectation of a higher level of privacy
in the information they contain.”168
A cell phone qualifies as a container. While a digital piece of information is “wholly
unlike any physical object found within a closed container,” the information found within the
cell phone is most likely the equivalent to the printed physical copy of the digital information.169
Before cell phones were invented, the information now kept on phones would have necessarily
been in physical form and carried in containers. 170 The capabilities of cell phones today, with
respect to the amount and type of digital content stored on the phones, serve as a substitute for
most of what people used to carry around as tangible objects and effects. 171 No longer is it
necessary to carry address books, calendars, photo albums, or file folders; all of these can be
contained in one small cell phone.172 When “viewed in this light, the cell phone merely acts as a
case (i.e. closed container)” holding one’s personal effects. 173 Thus, since everything stored on a
cell phone would be searchable if it were in its physical form, it seems logical that a cell phone
should always be characterized as a container for purposes of a search.
Nevertheless, a cell phone contains electronic information that is categorically different
from the physical information found inside ordinary containers. Although some cell phone
content would have been found in a searchable physical form in the past, much of the
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information stored on phones today would not have been. For example, with advancements in
electronic medical records, it is possible for someone to carry on their cell phone their entire
medical history which, in tangible form, could fill boxes. Similarly, cell phones can store vast
amounts of financial records that could presumably fill a filing cabinet. Cell phones can hold
entire libraries full of books, or record stores full of music. The argument that a cell phone
“merely acts as a case” or is a substitute for physically carrying one’s effects is preposterous.174
While some courts have considered the term “electronic container” in the context of cell
phone searches, they have explained that they fit within the ordinary container exception.175 But
modern cell phone capabilities justify that electronic containers be excluded from the ordinary
definition, rather than become a subset of the container exception. If this were the case, warrants
would be required, and citizens’ reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell phones would be
acknowledged and afforded constitutional protections.
D. PRIVACY ADVOCATES VS. LAW ENFORCEMENT
The technology created in order to extract information from cell phones is at the heart of
contention between privacy advocates and law enforcement agencies. This year in Michigan, the
American Civil Liberties Union received information that Michigan State Police were using
Cellebrite UFED to extract information from cell phones during routine traffic stops. 176 In an
interview, Mark P. Fancher, an ACLU Attorney for the Racial Justice Project, stated that “there
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is great potential for abuse here, in that a police officer or a State trooper who may not be
monitored or supervised on the street.”177
The ACLU wrote a letter to the State Police requesting information regarding what
mobile forensic devices were being used, how many were being used, how often, and why. 178
The letter also reiterated that using cell phone extraction devices, without the knowledge of the
cell phone user, violates the Fourth Amendment. 179 The Michigan State Police, however,
responded to the ACLU’s request for information on their use of extraction devices by stating
that “the State Police will provide information in accordance with the Freedom of Information
Act…there may be a processing fee to search for, retrieve, review, examine, and separate exempt
material” which has been estimated as costing those who request such information from the
police at about $500,000. Fancher replies, “This should be something that they should be
handing over freely. They should be more than happy to share with the public the routines and
the guidelines that they follow.”180
Michigan’s response to the ACLU’s letter should have a disturbing effect on every
citizen and privacy advocate around the nation. If one state is allowing its law enforcement to
use extraction devices without a warrant, it is likely that more states will follow in its lead unless
laws are passed controlling this action. Otherwise, in a sense, our phones are becoming “our
outboard brains,” putting us in a “very difficult privacy position.”181
Similarly, ever since the California Supreme Court’s decision in Diaz, California civil
rights advocates are coming forth in protest. For example, the Electronic Frontier Foundation
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(EFF), a non-profit digital rights advocacy group, supports a California bill which would require
state police officers to secure a warrant before searching an arrestee’s cell phone. 182 In Oregon,
the EFF filed an amicus brief on behalf of a criminal suspect who, forty minutes after being
arrested and placed in a holding cell, had his cell phone “fished through” by an investigator,
without a warrant, in order to uncover evidence related to his alleged crime. 183 Oregon officials
maintained that the warrantless search was excused as being a search incident to arrest. 184
However, EFF senior staff attorney Marcia Hofmann maintained that “this is an empty excuse
from the police—the suspect was in custody and unable to destroy evidence on his cell
phone.”185
Privacy advocates encourage cell phone users to set up passwords on their phones so that
the phone’s information and functions are less accessible to law enforcement. Catherine Crump
of the ACLU stated that “the police can ask you to unlock the phone—which many people will
do—but they almost certainly cannot compel you to unlock your phone without the involvement
of a judge.”186 According to a 2009 study, 60% of people protect their phone with a password.187
But, there are published guides available online that provide instructions on how to bypass
passwords placed on cell phones.188 Furthermore, mobile forensic technology can bypass
passwords as well. While password-protecting one’s phone makes it considerably harder for
officers to search the phone, it does not make it impossible. Therefore, while password
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protecting cell phones is merely one step in securing privacy rights, these passwords do not
guarantee privacy.

V. THE SCOPE OF SEARCHES, EXTRACTIONS, AND CLOUD COMPUTING:
WHERE SHOULD COURTS DRAW A LINE?
A. CELL PHONES AND COMPUTERS
Often, searches of cell phones have been likened to searches of computers. Like
warrantless cell phone searches, courts have come to varying conclusions on the constitutionality
of a warrantless computer search. In United States v. Forrester, the Ninth Circuit held that
police surveillance of a defendant’s computer through a pen register analogue located at the
Internet provider’s facility was reasonable.189 The two defendants in this case were arrested for
various drug offenses and during the investigation, police officers set up surveillance of one of
the defendants’ computer to obtain e-mail addresses of outgoing e-mails, addresses of websites
visited, and the total volume of information transmitted to and from his account.190 The court
concluded that the surveillance of the computer was analogous to the use of the pen register in
Smith v. Maryland which the Supreme Court held to be constitutional and not a search under the
Fourth Amendment since the information the pen register intercepted was being sent to a third
party, the telephone company.191 In its analysis, this court held that e-mail and Internet users,
like the telephone users in Smith, relied on third-party equipment in order to communicate, thus
their expectation of privacy in their e-mail or IP addresses of the websites they visited
diminished.192 Additionally, the court justified the computer surveillance on the grounds that the
information obtained did not reveal the underlying content of the communication, but merely the
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e-mail addresses and IP addresses, just like the pen register in Smith only revealed telephone
numbers.193 The officers neither obtained the specific information from the body of the emails,
nor the particular websites to which the IP addresses led.194
In United States v. Arnold, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a warrantless search of a
defendant’s laptop computer, separate hard drive, computer memory stick, and six compact discs
was lawful based upon the “border-search doctrine.”195 While the defendant was waiting in line
for customs upon returning to the United States from the Philippines, a U.S. Customs and Border
Patrol Officer selected him for secondary questioning whereupon his luggage was searched and
the laptop and its accessories were found.196 After searching the computer and equipment,
officers came across numerous images depicting child pornography which led to various charges
against the defendant.197 The district court held that, due to the nature of the private, personal
and valuable information stored on one’s computer, the search was invalid without a warrant or
reasonable suspicion.198 The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed and held that the warrantless
search of the defendant’s computer and equipment was valid under the border-search doctrine,
and thus, no reasonable suspicion was required. 199 Under the border-search doctrine, searches of
closed containers and their contents can occur at United States’ borders “without particularized
suspicion under the Fourth Amendment.”200 The justification for a border search is that the
United States has the authority “to search the baggage of arriving international travelers” based
193
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upon “its inherent sovereign authority to protect its territorial integrity.” 201 Thus, “by reason of
that authority, [the United States] is entitled to require that whoever seeks entry must establish
the right to enter and to bring into the country whatever he may carry.”202
By contrast, in United States v. James, the Eighth Circuit suppressed information
discovered on computer discs given to police by a third party.203 The defendant in this case was
arrested for sexual misconduct involving a child and, while in jail, wrote a letter to a third party
instructing him to destroy certain computer discs.204 Detectives intercepted the letter and went to
the third party’s home, without a warrant, where they obtained the discs and then viewed the
content of the discs at the police station. 205 The discs contained images of child pornography. 206
The court ultimately held that the detectives’ actions violated the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement because not only did the third party lack authority to consent to the search, as he had
no established common authority in owning the discs, but also no valid exception to the warrant
requirement applied to justify the detectives’ behavior.207
In the Washington court of appeals, a defendant was arrested on suspicion of auto
theft.208 While searching the defendant’s car, a laptop computer was found inside of a bag. 209
Suspecting that the laptop was stolen, the officer brought the computer to the police station
where another officer searched the computer files for information about its lawful owner. 210
Based upon the information found in the computer, the officers were able to contact the
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computer’s rightful owner and establish that the computer was stolen by the defendant. 211
Although the court found that the police had probable cause to both arrest the defendant and
seize the computer from the bag in the car, it concluded that the subsequent search of the
computer’s files was unlawful without a warrant. 212 The court explained that “probable cause to
believe property is stolen does not itself justify an investigative search of that property.”213
Instead, “compliance with the warrant requirement is necessary to ensure that the police are
justified in invading a person’s privacy interest to search for evidence.”214
As the varying case law demonstrates, it might seem obvious that with the cell phone
technology available today, “the line between cell phones and computers has become
increasingly blurry.”215 As there is still no unanimous precedent guiding all courts to address
cell phone or computer searches the same way, our Fourth Amendment privacy rights remain in
question. Consequently, our rights regarding cloud computing—a quickly growing phenomenon
that impacts both cell phones and computers—will likely be affected by this uncertainty.
B. CLOUD COMPUTING AND GROWING PRIVACY CONCERNS
Cloud computing is the act of storing and accessing applications and computer data
through the Internet, or a web browser, rather than running installed software on one’s personal
computer, such as Microsoft Word or Excel.216 In essence, “every piece of data you need for
every aspect of your life” is made available “at your fingertips and ready for use” by cloud
computing.217 It allows you to “sync up your devices” and access all of your content on
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“whatever device [you] have, wherever [you] happen to be.”218 Cloud computing also gives
users the ability to share all data, photos, contacts, documents, music, and more with others in an
instant, as well as gain access to the “public cloud and other personal clouds.”219
Any device with Internet access can take advantage of the cloud. Smartphones can easily
synchronize with e-mail, social media, word-processing, or music programs that can then be
accessed from any location and shared with whomever the user chooses. Additionally,
smartphones can synchronize with computers to give users the option to access their computer
through their phone. But what does this mean for our privacy rights? We do not know and
neither does the current law.
Synchronizing computers with cell phones exposes the cell phone user to myriad privacy
issues. One of the major aspects of cloud computing is that third-party service providers store
information in the cloud for one’s personal access. The rule from Smith v. Maryland, that a
person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information turned over to third parties,
seems to be applicable in the consideration of cloud computing.220 When one creates a personal
cloud, accessing the cloud from a smartphone must come through a third party, whether it is
Google, Facebook, Twitter, Outlook, and so forth. Therefore, since everything on a computer
can be placed on the cloud, and further accessed through a smartphone, then under Smith, there is
no reasonable expectation of privacy in any of this information. Consequently, law enforcement
can search and extract all of this information without a warrant. What a scary thought. Although
applying the Smith rule in this context is logical, citizens still anticipate having an expectation of
privacy in their smartphones, even if they are accessing a cloud. It is unreasonable to accept that
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simply using the cloud would permit the government to search and extract all of the content from
our phones. In an effort to protect citizens’ constitutional rights, while still maintaining a strong
criminal justice system, the scope of what the government can search and extract from cell
phones must be limited.
C. WHERE SHOULD COURTS DRAW THE LINE?
As the law stands today, the government has numerous ways of accessing the content
stored on one’s cell phone and computer, either through a warrantless search permitted under the
Fourth Amendment or by accessing the cloud. The scope of this access, however, must be
controlled. A line must be drawn somewhere, but as the law continuously struggles to keep up
with emerging cell phone technology, it is unclear where this line will be.
Recently in United States v. Maynard, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit considered, among other claims, the scope of a warrantless search that took place by
placing a GPS monitoring device on a co-defendant’s car in order to further a drug
investigation.221 In this case, the police installed the GPS device on the co-defendant’s car
without a warrant and monitored his movements twenty-four hours a day for four weeks.222
While this case concerned a warrantless search of a GPS device rather than a cell phone, the codefendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy was still at issue. The court expressed concern
with the expanding application of the Fourth Amendment exceptions, and it determined that the
monitoring of the car constituted a search and violated the co-defendant’s reasonable expectation
of privacy.223 A novel question emerged: to what extent does “comprehensive” and “sustained”
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surveillance trigger Fourth Amendment protections?224 The police were able to discover “the
totality and pattern of [the co-defendant’s] movements from place to place,” not merely
“movements from one place to another.”225 While the government maintained that the search
was valid because the co-defendant’s actions were exposed to the public, so he could have been
followed everywhere he went on public roads, the court held that “the whole of a person’s
movements over the course of a month is not actually exposed to the public because the
likelihood a stranger would observe all those movements is not just remote, it is essentially
nil.”226 The court further held that the information discovered by the police using the GPS was
not “constructively exposed to the public.”227 The court likened the GPS surveillance to a rap
sheet and explained that the prolonged surveillance “reveal[ed] types of information not revealed
by short-term surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, what he does not do, and what
he does ensemble.”228 In conclusion, the court held that the GPS monitoring “defeat[ed] an
expectation of privacy that our society recognizes as reasonable.”229
In many ways, the GPS surveillance in Maynard can be analogized to searches of cell
phones and access to personal clouds. Like the twenty-four hour tracking of the co-defendant,
searching and extracting content from one’s cell phone gives police officers a detailed picture of
the cell phone user’s life. An issue the D.C. Circuit faced was that the surveillance was sustained
for a long period of time. It was neither a one day occurrence nor a specific search that ended
quickly. Obtaining some data, text messages, contacts, or pictures from a cell phone is
equivalent to a short surveillance that could potentially be valid if the search is limited in scope
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and has a reasonable end point. But if law enforcement is able to get all information from a cell
phone or through a cloud, therefore reaching a computer, this search is the equivalent of the
unconstitutional twenty-four hour a day, four week surveillance in Maynard. Such a
comprehensive search would uncover vast amounts of private information. It is exactly this type
of information gathering that the Maynard court held unconstitutional as a violation of society’s
reasonable expectation of privacy in such content. Further, like the GPS information, the
information contained on a cell phone is not “constructively exposed to the public,” even if it can
be shared via cloud computing. The content shared on a cloud can be selectively chosen, and if
one so chooses, the cloud can remain “personal” and therefore, private.
Just as privacy advocates are paving the way for courts to address extraction technology,
The Digital Fourth Amendment Campaign has been created to lobby the government to create
search and seizure laws that are up-to-date with today’s digital world. The coalition “is
dedicated to bringing obsolete laws…into the digital age.”230 Specifically, the campaign is
asking Congress to “amend outdated U.S. laws originally intended to protect citizens against
unwarranted governmental access to their private information held electronically by third
parties.”231 The campaign maintains that “the laws protecting such information have been
eroded by technological change.”232 It recognizes the current gaps in legal protection that
American citizens face and asserts that “Congress can restore Americans’ individual liberties in
the digital age and ensure the Internet remains a powerful engine of economic growth, while
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preserving the tools needed by law enforcement investigations and removing legal uncertainty
that may hamper law enforcement’s effectiveness.”233

VI. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Amendment’s application, and criminal procedure in general, is being
challenged by the growth of a technologically sophisticated, cell phone-using society. As cell
phones advance, the law too must advance. It is no surprise that this is a difficult task facing all
courts today since, “given their unique nature as multifunctional tools, cell phones defy easy
categorization.”234
Law enforcement agencies recognize that they are struggling to keep up with quickly
changing mobile technology. In response, “this is forcing them to make new and perhaps strange
ethical choices.”235 The ability of law enforcement to search cell phones will no doubt be an
advantage for the government in prosecuting cases, but courts will encounter challenging Fourth
Amendment questions relating to these searches, especially when they result in extraction
through mobile forensic technology. As courts are faced with evidence from extraction devices,
case law will emerge, and complicated Fourth Amendment analyses will be undertaken
regarding the admissibility of the extracted data.
Until clear precedent is established, warrantless cell phone searches and extractions will
continue to be an issue. But, if courts choose to limit container searches to exclude cell phones,
designating them as “electronic containers,” law enforcement would always be required to obtain
warrants before searching and extracting the data contained on phones. If warrants become
required to search and extract electronic containers, mobile forensic devices will relieve any fear
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that the information on the phones will be lost or overridden due to the time delay in securing a
warrant, since these devices are able to retrieve any deleted information from the phones.
Cell phones today are capable of telling its user’s entire life story. With cloud
computing, and the option of synchronizing computers with cell phones, one becomes exposed to
countless privacy issues. In particular, whether Smith’s third party rule will continue to apply in
such a situation, thereby making everything on one’s personal cloud void of a reasonable
expectation of privacy and thus, searchable. Due to the incredible amount of personal
information capable of being found on cell phones, it is reasonable for citizens to expect a high
level of privacy in this information. As evidenced by groups such as the ACLU, EFF, and The
Digital Fourth Amendment Campaign, our Fourth Amendment rights are in jeopardy. It is not
only daunting, but unacceptable, if our laws are not updated accordingly so as to fairly address
the concerns of citizens, law enforcement, and privacy advocates alike.
In today’s society, cell phones and other forms of technology are the most highly
recognized forms of communication. These devices are ubiquitous in everyday life. We depend
on cell phones to keep our lives in order, to communicate, to assist, and to memorialize. It is
only fitting that citizens’ expectations of privacy in their cell phones be recognized and afforded
the full weight of Fourth Amendment protections.

43

